Capital flows: Catalyst or Hindrance to economic takeoffs? by Joshua Aizenman & Vladyslav Sushko
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We acknowledge advice from Brian Pinto, Senior Adviser at the World Bank, and funding from the
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Anchor. This paper is part of a broader investigation
at the PREM Anchor of the World Bank on financial integration and economic growth in developing
countries. The views herein are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the
views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated
organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent,
or the NBER.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Joshua Aizenman and Vladyslav Sushko. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.Capital flows: Catalyst or Hindrance to economic takeoffs?
Joshua Aizenman and Vladyslav Sushko




This paper applies a probit estimation to assess the relationship between economic takeoffs during
1950-2000 and inflows of portfolio debt, portfolio equity, and FDI, controlling for country’s stock
of short-term external debt and commodity terms of trade. Average level of FDI inflows is associated
with a 23 percent higher takeoff probability relative to a zero FDI inflow benchmark, and this effect
is highest for the Latin America subsample, with a 65 rise in takeoff probability. Higher stock of short
term external debt has been associated with a substantial negative effect on the probability of a takeoff,
and the effect of the short terms debt overhang is largest for Latin American countries. Yet, virtually
all the takeoffs were associated with a rise in portfolio debt inflows. At the sample mean, inflow of
portfolio debt is associated with approximately 25 percent higher probability of a takeoff. In contrast,
a one standard deviation increase in equity outflows (inflows) is associated with a 47 percent (17 percent)
decline in the probability of a takeoff. A one standard deviation improvement in commodity terms
of trade is associated with 28 percent higher takeoff probability.
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1  Introduction 
 
The large swings of financial flows between the OECD and emerging countries in the 2000s, and 
the growth turbulences associated with the financial crisis of 2008-9 put to the forefront the association 
between growth takeoffs and the revealed patterns of financial integration.   The renewed post-crisis large 
inflows of hot money to emerging and developing countries focused attention on the degree to which 
these flows would affect down the road the growth prospects of developing countries. For instance, 
Canuto (2010) describes various dangers from asset price overshooting caused by excessive foreign 
investor demand for emerging markets’ stocks, bonds, real estate, and other financial assets.   
Furthermore, the heightened volatility of commodity prices renewed concerns about the greater exposure 
of developing countries to adverse consequences of commodity terms of trade deterioration
1, as a given 
change in the relative prices of commodities tends to induce a much larger income effect in poorer 
countries.   
The growing global weight of emerging-market economics, and the growing gaps between non-
emerging developing and the emerging market countries propagated significant literature on conditions 
conducive to growth acceleration and economic takeoffs [see Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) and 
Aizenman and Spiegel (2010), and the references therein]. This paper focuses on narrow two key 
questions related to the future growth prospects of developing countries -- the marginal association 
between portfolio debt, portfolio equity, and FDI flows patterns and subsequent economic takeoffs; the 
marginal association between commodity terms of trade shocks and subsequent takeoffs. The importance 
of the composition of financial flows is drawing increasing attention among economic researchers and has 
been recently examined by Caballero (2010) and Joyce (2010) in the context of banking crises, by 
Aizenman, Lee, and Sushko (2010) in the context exchange market pressure, and Aizenman and Sushko 
(2011) in the study of growth of externally financially dependent sectors. 
We apply probit estimation methodology to assess the relationship between economic takeoffs 
during 1950-2000 and inflows of portfolio debt, portfolio equity, and FDI. In addition, we control for a 
country’s stock of short-term external debt and commodity terms of trade, via a new improved measure.  
We find rich and complex marginal association between capital flows and economic takeoffs.  Average 
level of FDI inflows is associated with a 23 percent higher takeoff probability relative to zero FDI inflow 
benchmark, and this effect is highest for the Latin America subsample, with a 65.4 rise in takeoff 
probability. Higher stock of short term external debt has been associated with a substantial negative effect 
on the probability of a takeoff, and the cumulative effect of the short terms debt overhang is largest for 
                                                           
1 In our sample, the volatility of commodity terms of trade changes (as measured by the conditional standard 
deviation) is 18 percent for Latin American and 17 percent for Asian economies compared to 5 percent for OECD 
countries.   2
Latin American countries.  Yet, virtually all the takeoffs were associated with a rise in portfolio debt 
inflows. This effect is substantial for Latin America, while it is virtually absent in Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries.  An increase in annual portfolio debt inflow from 0 to 0.26 percent of GDP (mean value for the 
entire sample) is associated with a 25 percent higher probability of a takeoff. The association between 
financial links through portfolio equity flows and takeoffs is negative: a one standard deviation increase 
in equity outflows (inflows) is associated with a 47% (17%) decline in the probability of a takeoff. We 
also validate the key importance of commodity terms of trade shocks: a one standard deviation 
improvement in commodity terms of trade is associated with 28% higher takeoff probability. 
The analysis of the duration of takeoffs shows that higher net portfolio debt inflows increase 
duration while the opposite is true of equity inflows. Also, greater improvement in a country’s commodity 
terms of trade at the time of a takeoff is also associated with a higher probability that a takeoff will be 
sustained. In contrast, higher net FDI inflows at the time of the takeoff are associated with lower 
probability that the takeoff will be sustained. This finding parallels that of Prasad, Rajan, and 
Subramanian (2007), who find that the positive association between FDI and economic growth observed 
between 1970 and 2000 was no longer there for 2000 through 2004, and of Aizenman and Sushko (2011), 
who find that the relationship between FDI inflows and real sector growth turns from positive to negative 
following prolonged periods of steady FDI inflows into a country. One possible interpretation of this 
result is that countries in which economic takeoff is driven by FDI inflows converge to a new steady state 
faster, hence resulting on shorter duration of high growth rate. Alternatively, “green” FDI may compete 
for financing with domestic firms crowding out incumbent firms out of the local bank lending in 
emerging markets, especially if domestic financial industry is not sufficiently developed. 
  Evaluating the economic impact of financial capital inflows on duration, we obtain that for 
countries that have entered a takeoff phase average portfolio debt inflow increases the probability that a 
takeoff will last 8 years or more by approximately 16.9 percent. Similarly, average net portfolio equity 
inflow of 0.08 percent of GDP leads to 12.7 percent lower probability of a sustained takeoff while the 
average net FDI inflow of 1.07 percent of GDP at the time of the takeoff leads to 38.5 percent lower 
probability of a sustained takeoff.  
 
 
2  Data  
  2.1  Takeoff definition 
We employ the methodology of Aizenman and Spiegel (2010) to identify takeoff episodes.  A 
takeoff is defined as the beginning of a five year consecutive growth of more than 5 percent following a 
stagnation episode.  A stagnation episode is defined as at least a 5 year interval where the real per capita   3
GDP growth is below 1 percent.
2 The data consists of an unbalanced panel of 146 countries from 1950 
through 2000. Of these, 114 countries have undergone stagnation episodes between 1960 and 1995 that 
could have resulted in a takeoff.  Given the takeoff definition employed [see Aizenman and Spiegel 
(2010) and the background literature reviewed there], a country can experience more than one potential 
takeoff episode and indeed a number of countries underwent more than one takeoff episode during the 
sample period. Out of the total 241 stagnation episodes during our sample period, 131 have resulted in 
takeoffs (TO=1). 
 
2.2  Financial conditioning variables 
The aim of this section is to assess the relative contribution of different types of financial flows to the 
probability of a takeoff.  Variable definition and sources are summarized in Table A1. We obtain data on 
portfolio debt flows, portfolio equity flows, and FDI flows from the IMF International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) database. We also control for a country’s stock of short-term external debt using data from the Joint 
External Debt Hub (JEDH) database, joint IMF and the World Bank, which is available for countries that 
subscribe to the IMF's Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS). In order for the results not to be 
affected by short-run business cycle fluctuations, in the regression analysis all financial flow and stock 
variables enter as 5-year averages (% GDP).  In addition, we introduce an improved commodity terms of 
trade (CTOT) measure following Ricci et. al (2008). Commodity prices in six categories (food, fuels, 
agricultural raw materials, metals, gold, and beverages) are weighted by the shares of each commodity in 
the country’s exports and imports then deflated by the manufacturing unit value index (MUV). Since 
commodity import and export shares are averaged over time, in addition to being more accurate the 
movements in CTOT are invariant to changes in export and import volumes in response to price 
fluctuations and thus isolate the impact of commodity prices on a county’s terms of trade (Spatafora and 
Tytell (2009)). 
Table A2 lists starting observation by country for the data on financial flows and the stock of 
short-term external debt. The first column indicates the year(s) in which a country experienced an 
economic takeoff. If observations on financial controls end prior to the year 2000, the ending year is 
indicated in parentheses. Comparing the dates of economic takeoffs with first available dates on financial 
flow variables, Table A2 shows that for a number of countries we are constrained by the data availability 
from IFS and JEDH.  For instance, the takeoff in Ghana occurred in 1960 whereas the disaggregated data 
on financial flows and short-term external debt does not become available until 1985. Similarly, Algeria 
underwent an economic takeoff in 1971 whereas the financial flow data does not become available for 
this nation until 1975. Thus, the analysis is constrained by data availability for a large subsample of 
                                                           
2 See Aizenman and Spiegel (2010) for the detailed takeoffs definition employed in this paper.   4
countries that underwent a takeoff in the 1960s and 70s. However, to the extent that some of the same 
nations had undergone either a period of stagnation with a potential takeoff or a realized second takeoff 
episode later in the sample period they still feature in our estimation results. 
  Table 1 reports conditional and unconditional means and standard deviations of 5-year averages 
of financial flows (% GDP), 5-year average stock of short-term external debt (% GDP), and annual 
percent change in commodity terms of trade. The conditional summary statistics are calculated for the 
subsample defined by countries undergoing a stagnation episode with a potential for a takeoff (TO=0) or 
entering an economic takeoff (TO=1), while the unconditional statistics are based on the entire sample, 
irrespective of a country’s state of economic growth. The first two columns of Table 1 report conditional 
and unconditional mean and standard deviations of capital flows for all countries, while subsequent 
columns report the same statistics for Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and OECD countries 
separately.  
Focusing on the means reported in the first two columns of Table 1, among capital flows, FDI 
inflows are the most important category with unconditional average annual inflow of approximately 2 
percent of GDP compared to 0.4 percent for portfolio debt and 0.2 percent for portfolio equity inflows 
respectively. Both conditional and unconditional shares of FDI inflows are highest in Latin American 
economies with 3.4 and 3.3 percent of GDP respectively (columns 3 and 4).  In addition, average annual 
portfolio equity inflows and FDI inflows are greater than outflows.  In particular, FDI inflows from 
abroad are an order of magnitude greater than comparable repatriations by domestic citizens (1.22 
compared to 0.18 percent of GDP), and this relationship is most pronounced for Latin American 
subsample with average annual FDI inflows of 3.44 percent of GDP, two orders of magnitude greater than 
comparable repatriations which comprise only 0.02 percent of GDP. As expected, the relationship 
between FDI inflows and outflow is more even for OECD countries (0.84 compared and 0.68 percent of 
GDP respectively), indicating that foreign direct investment flows tend to originate from developed 
countries dominating other types of financial inflows into developing countries during potential and 
realized economic takeoff episodes.   
Portfolio debt flows play the second most important role among capital flows. Similar to FDI 
flows, the countries in our sample experience a net inflow of portfolio debt investment, 0.26 percent of 
GDP in annual inflows compared 0.13 percent in outflows. The relationship is even starker for Asian 
economies in a potential or a realized takeoff phase, with conditional average inflows more than 15 times 
greater than outflows, while it is reverse for Latin American subsample, with annual portfolio debt 
outflows approximately two times greater than inflows. 
On the other hand, portfolio equity is the least important category of capital flows across all the 
subsamples. Similarly to FDI outflows, portfolio equity outflows are negative on average, indicating that   5
domestic citizens are redeeming their overseas equity and direct investments when a country is on the 
brink or entering a takeoff phase.  
  The conditional average stock of short-term external debt is approximately 5.68 percent of GDP 
for the entire sample, with Asian and Sub-Saharan Africa countries holding slightly lower shares than the 
mean at 4.49 and 4.72 percent of GDP respectively, while Latin American countries on average hold two 
times greater share of short-term external debt to GDP at 9.12 percent. Finally, counties in stagnation or 
on the brink of a takeoff tend to be experiencing a mild deterioration in the terms of trade at -1.18 
percentage points. However, the standard errors for this series are an order of magnitude higher than the 
mean for all subsamples except for OECD countries, pointing at a considerable cross-country and time 
variation in the terms of trade changes even when smoothed to 5-year tolling averages. 
 
2.3  Additional controls 
The remaining controls follow Aizenman and Spiegel (2010) and proxy for a country’s 
institutional features, industrial and financial development, political stability, and economic openness. We 
measure de facto openness as the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP in local currency units using IFS 
data. The average annual tariff rate for each country was obtained from Dollar-Kraay (2004) data. We 
measure income level of log of GDP per capita and population as log of total population using Heston, 
Summers, and Aten (2009) Penn World Tables 6.3. We combine these variables with regional dummies 
for Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and OECD for our base specification.  
The baseline specification is then augmented with additional conditioning variables. We measure 
years of schooling as the average years of education in the population above the age of 25 from the Barro 
and Lee (1993) dataset. The data on commodities, manufacturing, and services as share of GDP come 
from the WDI data labeled Comm/GDP, Manuf/GDP, and Serv/GDP respectively. Also from WDI we 
obtain measure of domestic credit, liquid liabilities, and money to GDP ratios labeled DomCredit, 
Liquidity, and Money respectively. Following Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005), we construct a 
political regime change indicator, Reg.Chng., as a three-unit change in the Marshall-Jaggers (2002) Policy 
IV dataset. The variable War End takes on a value of 1 if there has been a cessation of conflict within the 
previous 5 years and 0 otherwise and the variable Civil War takes on a value of 1 if there has been a civil 
war within the previous 5 years and zero otherwise. Both variables come from the Singer and Small 
(2003) Correlates of War database. Finally, the Leader Death political variable comes from the Jones and 
Olken (2005) dataset and takes on the value of 1 if a country’s leader has died within the previous 5 years 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
   6
3  Non-Parametric Analysis 
Table 2 shows the differences in the means of financial flows for subsamples of countries that do 
not experience a takeoff with 10 years following a stagnation episode (TO=0) and those that do (TO=1). 
Countries that experience a takeoff  have somewhat lower level of portfolio debt and FDI outflows on the 
on hand and statistically significantly greater level of portfolio debt and FDI inflows on the other. Most 
notably, the average FDI inflows are approximately 1.8% higher for countries that experience a takeoff 
compared to those that do not. The results are opposite for portfolio equity flows: countries that undergo a 
takeoff episode have statistically significantly larger equity outflows and marginally lower equity inflows. 
The negative association between portfolio equity outflows and successful transition from economic 
stagnation to a takeoff may be due to the flight of domestic savings to foreign equities, especially in Latin 
American countries. We address this association in the parametric estimation results. Finally, countries 
that undergo a takeoff following a stagnation phase have on average lower stock of short-term external 
debt (% GDP) and an increase in commodity terms of trade (CTOT), but these differences are statistically 
insignificant in this preliminary non-parametric examination.  
  Figures 1 through 3 illustrate the time-series relationship between selected takeoff conditioning 
variables and economic growth for three countries from each of the following regions: Caribbean-Latin 
America, East and South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The year(s) in which a country experienced an 
economic takeoff are marked with vertical bars. As Figure 1 shows, the growth rate of real GDP exhibits 
a negative association with a country’s stock of short-term external debt. Taking Philippines as an 
example, the rise in short-term external debt from less than 10 percent to 30 percent of GDP between 
1975 and 1982 was followed by a sharp contraction in annual GDP growth rate from close to 5 to -10 
percent per year over the same time period. This period of economic stagnation was finally followed by a 
takeoff in 1992, which was preceded by a reduction in short-term external debt to its pre-1975 level of 
approximately 10 percent of GDP.   
Figure 2 focuses on the association between economic growth and FDI inflows. Consistent with 
the subsample analysis of the means in Table 1, the graphical examination points at the positive co-
movement in the two series. Focusing on the experience of Fiji and Mexico, the 1983 and 1995 respective 
takeoffs in the two countries were preceded by a rise in annual FDI inflows (from approximately 0 to 2 
percent of GDP in Fiji and from 1 to 3 percent of GDP in Mexico). 
Finally, Figure 3 examines the time-series behavior of GDP growth rates and change in a 
country’s commodity terms of trade (CTOT). As in the case with FDI inflows, the series exhibit positive 
co-movement for the majority of the selected countries. Focusing on Latin American countries, economic 
growth and CTOT of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico exhibit a close relationship. Both the 1973 and 1983   7
takeoff episodes in Chile were preceded by a change in CTOT movement from deterioration (less than 0) 
to an improvement (greater than 0) in the years prior.  
 
4  Parametric Analysis 
4.1  Methodology 
Following Aizenman and Spiegel (2010) we use a probit estimation methodology. Specifically 
for a country i we estimate the conditional probability of TO=1 given our set of financial flow and stock 
variables and a number of country level controls: 
 
Pr     = 1   ,  ,  , ,  ,    = 1 − Φ   
′  +   
′   +   
′   ,        (1) 
 
where Φ( ) denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable and the vectors of 
controls include: 









































































We are most interested in the coefficient vector on xi, as well as coefficients on short-term 
external debt and change in CTOT. The remaining controls have been examined by AS2010 and are 
included for robustness. The estimation is conducted with robust standard errors clustered by country, as 
several countries in the sample undergo more than one takeoff episode. Having obtained the coefficient 
vector, we can evaluate the marginal effect of each control variable on the conditional expectation of a 
takeoff: 
 
         ,  ,  ,   ,    ,      
   
=   −     
′    +     
′     +     
′         .            (2) 
Probit regressions allow to evaluate the marginal contribution of each conditioning variable to the 
probability of TO=1, with partial effect in (2) estimated at the sample average of all controls variables.  
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We then evaluate the economic impact of each control on the probability of a takeoff in three 
ways. The first method consists of multiplying the estimate of the partial effect in (2) by the variable’s 
mean, which gives us an estimate of the probability change relative to the benchmark of zero for the 
control of interest. For example, by multiplying the mean annual FDI inflows by their partial contribution 
to the probability of a takeoff in (2) we obtain an estimate of the change in the likelihood of a takeoff 
relative to the case if the country was experiencing zero FDI inflows. The second method consists of 
multiplying the value in equation (2) by the variable’s standard deviation to evaluate its economic impact 
on the probability of a takeoff.  Both first and second method assume that the marginal contribution of 
each explanatory variable to the probability of TO=1 is constant across the entire support, which is the 
same as assuming a linear cumulative probability density, a highly unrealistic assumption. Therefore, the 
third method consists of measuring the differences in the predicted probabilities of a takeoff between 
specific countries whose values of conditional variables are approximately one standard deviation apart, 
with the lower value drawn close to the sample mean.  
 
4.2  Estimation Results 
 
The probit regression results for baseline specification used in the standard deviation analysis 
above are reported in Table 3. Specifications (1) through (6) report probit estimates for all countries, with 
specifications (4) through (6) including the stock of short-term external debt (% GDP) in the control 
vector. Specifications (7) and (8) exclude countries classified as “High Income” in the WDI data focusing 
only on “Low & Middle Income” countries. Instead of reporting the probit coefficient vector that does not 
have a ready economic interpretation, we report marginal effects of each independent variable and the 
associated standard errors. The interpretation follows equation (2) and quantifies the probability change of 
observing a takeoff due to a unit change in the conditioning variable. For example, focusing on 
specification (2) used in the one standard deviation analysis in previous sections, the coefficient of -0.54 
on Latin American dummy indicates that evaluated at sample means of the entire control vector, the 
probability of TO=1 is 54 percent lower for Latin American economies. 
As a way to check the goodness of fit of the mode, Figure 3 plots probit regression residuals and 
well as actual versus fitted values based on regression specification (2) in Table 6.  As the figure shows, 
the residuals are fairly well behaved and centered around zero. The model fits the majority of takeoff 
episodes fairly well, with substantial errors resulting when the model predicted a takeoff where one was 
not realized in 1982 in Australia and in 1983 in Comoros. 
   9
As results reported in Table 3 indicate, most associations between takeoff probability and 
financial capital flows are robust to alternative specifications.  The marginal effect of portfolio debt 
inflows on takeoff probability is positive and statistically significant in 7 out of 8 specifications. The 
marginal effects of both equity inflows and outflows are negative (with the exception of outflows in 
specifications (4) and (6)), while the marginal effects of links through FDI flows are positive and 
statistically significant in a number of specifications. 
Since economic takeoffs are primarily a feature of emerging and developing economies, 
specifications (7) and (8) only include low and middle income countries in the sample. The effect of 
portfolio debt outflow is negative but becomes statistically significant (-0.899*** compared to -0.043) 
while the positive effect of portfolio debt inflows more than doubles in magnitude (2.026*** compared to 
0.905***) in specification (7) compared to specification (1). The coefficients on portfolio equity flows 
remain negative, with the effect of a 1 percentage point increase in portfolio equity outflows taking on the 
value of -3.854* compared to -3.316** and the negative marginal effect of portfolio equity inflows 
becoming significantly larger and statistically significant (-3.715*** compared to -0.901) in specification 
(7) compared to specification (1). Focusing on the third capital flow category, the marginal effect of FDI 
outflows is insignificant when high income countries are excluded from the sample, while the coefficient 
on remains positive and significant with approximately the same magnitude. The marginal effect of 
commodity terms of trade improvement is also positive and statistically significant. Overall, the 
specifications (7) and (8) indicate that the marginal effects of most capital flows on the probability of 
economic takeoff are more pronounced when only low and middle income countries are considered. The 
marginal effect of portfolio debt, FDI inflows, and commodity terms of trade are positive, with the effect 
of debt more than double for this subsample of countries, while the negative effects of portfolio debt 
outflows and portfolio equity flows in both directions are larger in magnitude. 
Focusing on the stock of “hot money,” as specifications (3) through (6) indicate the marginal 
effect of stock of short-term external debt is negative, confirming the popular prior that unlike direct 
investment, “hot money” is detrimental to economic takeoffs. Notably, the data on short-term external 
debt is available for a smaller sample, reducing the number of observations from above 90 in 
specifications (1) through (3) to 65 or less in specification (5) through (6), which can result in the 
instability of coefficients on several controls variables. 
Table 4 shows probit estimation results of the association between financial flows and takeoffs 
with expanded set of controls following (note that controls from the baseline specification also included 
in the regression but results not reported for brevity).  The results indicate that the positive association 
between the probability of a takeoff and foreign debt investment flows as well as between the two-way 
FDI flows and takeoffs is robust to controlling for a set of political, industrial, financial, and demographic   10 
country characteristics. Unlike linkages through FDI flows, linkages through equity markets exhibit a 
negative association with the probability of a takeoff, with coefficients on portfolio investment equity 
asset flows particularly robust. In addition, portfolio debt outflows also exhibit negative association with 
the probability of a takeoff. However, the significance of the coefficients is not very robust to alternative 
specifications. The association between takeoffs and short-term external debt is statistically significant 
and robust given this larger set of controls. Overall, the results of Table 4 are consistent with baseline 
regressions indicating that takeoff episodes are positively associated with inflows of foreign debt 
investments and two-way FDI linkages and negatively associated with financial capital flows abroad and 
the buildup of short-term external debt. 
Table 5 reports baseline regression results interacting financial flow variables with selected 
regional dummies. A conjecture being examined is that the negative association between equity flows 
abroad is a feature of Latin American countries where foreign equities traditionally serve as a store of 
value of a large segment of wealth population. The coefficient on the interaction term between portfolio 
equity assets and Latin America dummy is negative, statistically significant, and an order of magnitude 
larger indicating that this feature is characteristic of Latin American economies. 
 
4.3  Economic Impact  
Table 6 and Table 7 report the estimated economic impact of the conditioning variables on the 
probability of a takeoff. Table 6 shows the estimates obtained by multiplying subsample mean value of 
each variable by its marginal effect in equation (2) giving the change in the probability of TO=1 due to 
the deviation in the explanatory variable from zero by its subsample mean. For example, an increase in 
annual portfolio debt inflow from 0 to 0.26 percent of GDP (mean value for the entire sample (Table 1)) 
is associated with a 24.6 percent higher probability of a takeoff. Average level of FDI inflows is 
associated with a 23.2 percent higher takeoff probability relative to zero FDI inflow benchmark and this 
effect is highest for the Latin America subsample with a 65.4 rise in takeoff probability. Higher stock of 
short-term external debt has a substantial negative effect on the probability of a takeoff. Given the sample 
mean short-term debt holdings of 5.7 percent of GDP (see Table 1), the probability of an economic 
takeoff is 25.6 percent lower relative to the zero short-term debt benchmark. The cumulative effect is 
largest for Latin American countries, where, given their average short-term debt holdings, the probability 
of a takeoff is reduced by 41.0 percent relative to the zero debt benchmark. 
The results in Table 7 are based on standard deviations for the entire sample and the subsamples 
of Latin American, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asian countries. Focusing on the variables with statistically 
significant coefficients (denoted by asterisks), a one standard deviation increase in the inflow of portfolio 
debt is associated with 71.1 percent higher probability of a takeoff. The effect is even larger for Asia   11 
(93.7 percent) suggesting that virtually all the takeoffs in these countries during our sample period were 
associated with a rise in portfolio debt inflows. At 41.5 percent, the effect is also substantial for Latin 
America, while it is virtually absent in Sub-Saharan Africa countries (0.1 percent). 
In contrast to portfolio debt inflows, the association between portfolio equity flows and takeoffs 
is negative. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in equity outflows is associated with a 47.0 
percent decline in the probability of a takeoff. The effect is much smaller for geographical subsamples, 
indicating that given this methodology it is driven by large standard deviation in portfolio equity outflows 
of OECD countries (the standard deviation of these flows is 0.23 percent of GDP in OECD compared to 
0.02 in Latin American countries).  
Unlike portfolio equity flows, greater linkages through FDI flows exhibit positive association 
with the probability of a successful transition from economic stagnation to a takeoff. A one standard 
deviation increase in FDI outflows is associated with a 62.3 percent higher probability of an economic 
takeoff. As is the case with the one standard deviation analysis for equity outflows, this high figure for the 
combined sample is driven by high standard deviation of FDI outflows from OECD countries. The next 
row in Table 7 shows that a one standard deviation rise in FDI inflows is associated with 75.5 percent 
greater chance of an economic takeoff. The impact is 84.7 percentage points for Latin American countries 
while it is lower for Sub-Saharan Africa and Asian countries at 18.7 and 29.3 percentage points 
respectively. 
The positive association between FDI flows and takeoff probability can be substantially offset if a 
country accumulates the stock a short-term external debt. A one standard deviation rise short-term 
external debt as a percentage of GDP is associated with 37.5 lower takeoff probability. The impact is 
more severe in Latin American countries at -55.7 percentage points, while slightly below the full sample 
average in absolute value for African and Asian economies.  
Finally, a one standard deviation improvement in commodity terms of trade is associated with a 
28.4 percent higher takeoff probability. At 31.0 percent, the association is marginally higher for Latin 
American countries, most likely due to greater proportion of commodity exporters in this region.  
As mentioned above, the marginal contribution of control variables to the probability of a takeoff 
is estimated at a point on the cumulative density corresponding to the sample means of controls. Since the 
relationship between the takeoff probability and the values of the conditioning variables is not necessarily 
linear, the first derivative of the density function that captures the marginal effect of an incremental 
increase in control to the probability of TO=1 is also subject to change. The sensitivity of the estimates 
presented in Table 6 and Table 7 to the value of controls is captured in Figure 5 and Figure 6. The figures 
show predicted probability of a takeoff as a function of portfolio debt inflows and portfolio equity 
outflows respectively (both significant determinants of takeoff in the probit regressions). The fitted line   12 
represents the best fractional polynomial fit to the predicted probabilities.  Since the predicted probability 
density is best fitted by a concave curve, the marginal effects are not constant along the support of each 
control variable. To address this issue, we pick actual observations for each control variable that are 
approximately one standard deviation apart and report the associated change in the predicted value for the 
probability of TO=1. Table 8 reports the results. 
  Focusing on the variables with significant coefficients in the probit regressions, Table 8 shows 
that a rise in 5-year average portfolio debt inflow from 0.25 (South Africa in 1991) to 1.03 percent of 
GDP (Thailand in 1998) is associated with a rise in predicted probability of a takeoff of 39.3 percent. A 
rise in portfolio equity outflow from -0.03 (repatriation in Korea in 1994) to 0.11 percent of GDP (Israel 
in 1989) is associated with a fall in predicted takeoff probability of 60.5 percent. Also, as the previous 
estimates indicated, FDI flows are positively associated with predicted takeoff probabilities. In particular, 
a rise in FDI inflows from 1.24 (Mexico in 1980) to 5.71 percent of GDP (Malaysia in 1992) is associated 
with a 74.0 percentage point rise in the predicted takeoff probability.  On the other hand, a rise in the 5-
year average of the stock of short-term external debt from 5.5 (Mexico in 1980) to 14.6 percent of GDP 
(Bolivia in 1986) is associated a 20 percentage point decline in the predicted probability of a takeoff. The 
negative relationship between stock of short-term external debt and takeoff probability is shown in Figure 
7. For a given increase in the stock of short-term external debt, the decline in the predicted probability of 
a takeoff appears rapid and monotone, with correlation coefficient of -0.2081 (p-value = 0.000). Unlike 
the association between financial flows, which was highly non-linear, the negative relationship between 
short-term external debt and takeoff probability is fairly well approximated by a linear fit, which is 
consistent with similar magnitude of economic impact for this variable reported in Tables 6 and 7. Overall, 
in terms of the relative magnitudes of the predicted impact on the probability of a takeoff, the results 
reported in Table 8 are broadly consistent with estimates under more restrictive assumptions reported in 
Table 7. 
The heightened volatility of commodity prices renewed concerns about the greater exposure of 
developing countries to commodity terms of trade shocks, as a given change in the relative prices of 
commodities tends to induce a much larger income effect in poorer countries. Figure 8 shows that the 
association percent change in commodity terms of trade (dCTOT) and the probability of a takeoff (TO=1) 
is highly dependent on country income. More precisely, the figure depicts the income effect of 
commodity terms of trade shock for countries of different income levels.  
The income effect is proxied by the marginal effect of a positive commodity terms of trade shock 
on the on the probability of a takeoff. The left axis shows marginal effects estimated with baseline probit 
specification (2) at the given income level (horizontal axis, log scale); z-statistics of estimated coefficients 
in parentheses. Points of GDP per capita corresponding to subsamples averages of Sub-Saharan Africa,   13 
Latin America, Asia, and OECD are labeled accordingly. Marginal effect of approximately 1.7 for a 
country with GDP per capita of $4,000 (which is the subsample average for Asian countries) indicates 
that a 1 percent improvement in the commodity terms of trade is associated with a 1.6 percent higher 
predicted probability of economic takeoff. Note that both the magnitude and statistical significance of 
marginal effects of dCTOT on Pr(TO=1) are highest for developing Latin American and Asian economies 
in the middle income range, then drops off dramatically with income.  
The right axis follows the one-standard deviation analysis procedure showing the product of the 
marginal effect coefficient in baseline specification (2) multiplied by the subsample standard deviation of 
dCTOT for each income range. For a country with income level of approximately $4,000 per capita a one 
standard deviation improvement in commodity terms of trade is associated with greater than 25 percent 
higher probability of a takeoff. Thus, a one standard deviation improvement in the terms of trade in Latin 
American and Asian economics translates into a 25 percentage and 28 percentage points higher takeoff 
probability compared to a much lower 6 percentage point improvement for OECD economies. Overall, 
the marginal effects from the baseline probit regression estimated at different income levels confirm the 
notion that developing economies are much more sensitive to commodity terms of trade shocks, with 
estimates for these countries larger in both magnitude and in statistical significance. 
 
5.  Determinants of sustained takeoffs 
  This section examines the relationship between duration of takeoffs and the nature of financial 
exposure at the time of the takeoff. Following Aizenman and Spiegel (2010), we define sustained takeoffs 
as periods of high growth lasting at least 8 years. Given such second stage of conditioning, the sample is 
significantly reduced. To compensate, we reduce the control vector by looking at net flows in each 
financial capital category. Table 9 presents the marginal effects from probit estimation results. 
  Consistent with their association with an occurrence of a takeoff, higher net portfolio debt inflows 
raise the probability of a sustained takeoff while net portfolio equity inflows lower the probability of a 
sustained takeoff.  Also consistent with the its association with an initial takeoff, greater improvement in a 
country’s commodity terms of trade at the time of a takeoff is associated with a higher probability that a 
takeoff will be sustained.  
However, the association between net inflows of FDI at the time of the takeoff has the opposite 
impact on its duration. While the preceding analysis shows that higher FDI inflows are associated with 
higher probability of an economic takeoff, the negative and statistically significant marginal effect 
reported in Table 9 indicates that higher net FDI inflows at the time of the takeoff are associated with 
lower probability that the takeoff will be sustained. This finding parallels that of Prasad, Rajan, and 
Subramanian (2007), who find that the positive association between FDI and economic growth observed   14 
between 1970 and 2000 was no longer there for 2000 through 2004, and of Aizenman and Sushko (2011), 
who find that the relationship between FDI inflows and real sector growth turns from positive to negative 
following prolonged periods of steady FDI inflows into a country. One possible interpretation of this 
result is that countries in which economic takeoff is driven by FDI inflows converge to a new steady state 
faster, hence resulting on shorter duration of high growth rate. Alternatively, “green” FDI may compete 
for financing with domestic firms crowding out incumbent firms out of the local bank lending in 
emerging markets, especially if domestic financial industry is not sufficiently developed. 
  Next, we assess the economic impact of the three types of capital flows relative to the zero 
benchmark using their averages conditional on country being in a takeoff phase.  Multiplying the 0.47 
percent of GDP average net portfolio debt inflow by the 0.36 marginal effect reported in specification (1) 
of Table 9, we obtain that for countries that have entered a takeoff phase average portfolio debt inflow 
increases the probability that a takeoff will last 8 years or more by approximately 16.9 percent. Similarly, 
average net portfolio equity inflow of 0.08 percent of GDP leads to 12.7 percent lower probability of a 
sustained takeoff while the average net FDI inflow of 1.07 percent of GDP at the time of the takeoff leads 
to 38.5 percent lower probability of a sustained takeoff. 
  Moving to the interpretation of additional controls, country income exhibits a negative 
association with takeoff duration, indicating that the probability of a sustained high rate of economic 
growth is lower for economies with higher GDP per capita at the time of the takeoff.  The marginal 
effects of population and openness are positive, indicating that more populous open economies tend to 
experience longer lasting periods of high growth following entry into a takeoff phase.  Focusing on 
regional dummies, in most specifications Latin American, Asian, and Sub-Saharan African countries tend 
to experience shorter takeoff, which the negative marginal effect of the Sub-Saharan dummy particularly 
robust. Finally, a positive marginal effect of regime change dummy indicates that the likelihood of a 
sustained takeoff is higher if it was preceded by a political regime change. 
  The last specification in Table 9 includes the stock of short-term external debt as a control. The 
marginal effect is negative, however not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In addition, 
combined with greater censoring of the dependent variable and data availability on the “hot money” 
variable, the sample is greatly reduced, making inference based on this specification somewhat 
problematic. 
 
  6.  Conclusion 
We apply probit estimation methodology to assess the relationship between economic takeoffs 
during 1950-2000 and inflows of portfolio debt, portfolio equity, and FDI. In addition, we control for a 
country’s stock of short-term external debt and commodity terms of trade, via a new improved measure.    15 
We find rich and complex marginal association between capital flows and economic takeoffs. Regionally, 
Latin American economies exhibit the greatest sensitivity to financial linkages. The association between 
financial links through portfolio equity flows and takeoffs is negative. So is the association with stock of 
short term external debt, with the cumulative effect of the short terms debt overhang largest for Latin 
American. Yet, virtually all the takeoffs were associated with a rise in portfolio debt inflows. This effect 
is also substantial for Latin America, while it is virtually absent in Sub-Saharan Africa countries.  
Average level of FDI inflows is associated with a higher takeoff probability and this effect is highest for 
the Latin America subsample. We also validate the key importance of commodity terms of trade shocks: a 
one standard deviation improvement in commodity terms of trade is associated with 28% higher takeoff 
probability. 
The analysis of the duration of takeoffs shows that higher net portfolio debt inflows increase 
duration while the opposite is true of equity inflows. Also, greater improvement in a country’s commodity 
terms of trade at the time of a takeoff is associated with a higher probability that a takeoff will be 
sustained. In contrast, higher net FDI inflows at the time of the takeoff are associated with lower 
probability that the takeoff will be sustained. Comparing the economic magnitudes of the association with 
each type of private capital inflow, FDI exhibits the largest (and negative) effect, potentially offsetting the 
positive effect of portfolio debt inflows in sustaining the takeoff episodes. In sum, not just the degree of 
financial openness, but the nature of financial integration matters greatly for a country’s prospect of 
entering and sustaining economic takeoffs. Furthermore, the complex association between FDI and 
economic takeoffs – direct financing is associated with greater number of takeoffs, but not with the most 
sustained ones – is in line with several recent studies that detect complex and non-linear association 
between the accumulation of FDI and growth. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Means and standard deviations of the financial determinants of economic takeoffs
 
Notes: The table reports conditional and unconditional means and standard deviations of 5-year averages of financial 
flows, 5-year average stock of short-term external debt, and annual percent change in commodity terms of trade. The 
conditional summary statistics are calculated for the subsample defined by countries  undergoing a stagnation 















Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond.
portfolio debt outflow (% GDP) -0.130 -0.247 -0.226 -0.093 -0.005 -0.023 -0.022 -0.006 -0.352 -0.796
(0.781) (1.126) (0.923) (0.699) (0.024) (0.127) (0.048) (0.236) (1.379) (1.956)
portfolio debt inflow   0.262 0.399 0.148 0.298 0.001 0.022 0.356 0.168 0.795 1.121
(0.757) (0.982) (0.442) (1.088) (0.011) (0.192) (0.998) (0.596) (1.217) (1.326)
portfolio equity outflow   -0.031 -0.145 -0.002 -0.020 -0.001 -0.012 0.000 -0.004 -0.091 -0.382
(0.133) (0.825) (0.017) (0.122) (0.028) (0.181) (0.000) (0.037) (0.232) (1.199)
portfolio equity inflow   0.075 0.191 0.083 0.078 0.054 0.053 -0.001 0.089 0.151 0.461
(0.261) (1.070) (0.347) (0.273) (0.208) (0.279) (0.002) (0.288) (0.352) (1.755)
fdi outflow   -0.180 -0.373 -0.019 -0.075 -0.038 -0.135 0.002 -0.099 -0.681 -1.000
(0.520) (1.039) (0.046) (0.239) (0.108) (0.472) (0.016) (0.251) (0.863) (1.440)
fdi inflow  1.218 1.999 3.443 3.275 0.486 1.099 1.392 1.571 0.843 1.315
(3.972) (5.130) (8.918) (4.638) (0.984) (2.840) (1.540) (1.869) (0.868) (1.500)
short-term external debt   5.683 6.651 9.115 8.446 4.721 6.285 4.495 4.978 0.000 0.000
(8.332) (10.419) (12.369) (15.501) (6.362) (8.116) (7.706) (5.736) (0.000) (0.000)
change in CTOT (% Chng.) -1.180 -1.024 -4.395 -2.146 1.150 -1.002 -7.131 -1.526 -2.471 -1.088
(16.587) (13.960) (18.141) (17.216) (17.931) (15.477) (16.499) (12.569) (4.788) (9.659)
All Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa Asia OECD  18 
Table 2: Financial flows, short-term external debt, and terms of trade: non-takeoffs vs. takeoffs 
 
Note: Means of conditioning variables for countries that do not (TO=1) and do (TO=1) experience a takeoff 
following a period of stagnation. *, **, and *** indicate the differences in means statistically significant at 10%, 5%, 








Conditioning variables TO = 0 TO = 1 Diff.
portfolio debt outflow -0.0015 -0.0011 0.0004
(0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0016)
p-value 0.4071
portfolio debt inflow 0.0006 0.0047 0.0041 ***
(0.0003) (0.0014) (0.0014)
p-value 0.0032
portfolio equity outflow -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0004 **
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
p-value 0.0458
portfolio equity inflow 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005)
p-value 0.3079
fdi outflow -0.0020 -0.0016 0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0010)
p-value 0.3313
fdi inflow  0.0062 0.0176 0.0113 *
(0.0013) (0.0073) (0.0074)
p-value 0.0648
short-term external debt 0.0589 0.0545 -0.0044
(0.0093) (0.0147) (0.0174)
p-value 0.4005
change in CTOT -0.0250 0.0004 0.0254
(0.0171) (0.0154) (0.0231)
p-value 0.1358  19 
Table 3: Takeoffs and financial flows, base regressions (dependent variable: realization of a takeoff) 
 
Notes: Probit estimation results with clustering by country and robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** 
indicate coefficients significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Marginal effect estimates used in the 
standard deviation analysis take from specification (2) (highlighted). For specifications (3), (5), and (6) OECD 
dummy dropped due to collinearity. For specifications (7) and (8), Asia dummy predicts success perfectly, therefore 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
portfolio debt outflow -0.043 -0.045 -0.013 9.691*** 5.155* -10.517 -0.899*** -0.977**
(0.130) (0.151) (0.133) (3.334) (2.743) (11.247) (0.340) (0.399)
portfolio debt inflow 0.905*** 0.939** 0.919** 1.339** 1.309** 1.927 2.026*** 1.984**
(0.326) (0.381) (0.369) (0.627) (0.531) (1.519) (0.639) (0.864)
portfolio equity outflow -3.316** -3.544** -3.662** 0.598 -0.902 -23.678*** -3.854* -4.114*
(1.453) (1.508) (1.590) (4.876) (5.446) (7.040) (2.155) (2.332)
portfolio equity inflow -0.601 -0.645 -0.558 -0.241 -0.36 -0.919** -3.715*** -4.063***
(0.385) (0.423) (0.348) (0.414) (0.348) (0.441) (1.286) (1.508)
fdi outflow 1.059** 1.198** 1.199** 1.139* 0.587 12.06 1.260 1.389
(0.482) (0.519) (0.564) (0.665) (1.035) (11.074) (0.778) (0.851)
fdi inflow  0.145** 0.190* 0.094 0.330*** 0.179* 0.271 0.221* 0.331**
(0.063) (0.102) (0.072) (0.114) (0.104) (0.351) (0.128) (0.163)
change in CTOT 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.014*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
openness -0.094 -0.499* -0.796
(0.253) (0.288) (0.699)




loggdp -0.300* -0.262 -0.202 -0.21 -0.11 -0.332 -0.994*** -0.953***
(0.158) (0.163) (0.150) (0.172) (0.174) (0.323) (0.348) (0.356)
logpop -0.002 0.000 -0.026 -0.044 -0.106 -0.15 0.069 0.08
(0.042) (0.047) (0.063) (0.057) (0.077) (0.106) (0.074) (0.077)
Latin America -0.456***-0.539***-0.547***-0.637***-0.686*** -0.584** -0.755*** -0.682***
(0.169) (0.121) (0.129) (0.110) (0.154) (0.265) (0.162) (0.189)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.673***-0.709***-0.669***-0.804***-0.749*** -0.642* -1.000*** -1.000***
(0.209) (0.182) (0.185) (0.169) (0.184) (0.386) (0.001) (0.001)
Asia -0.2 -0.175 -0.112 0.178 -0.096 0.694***
(0.271) (0.306) (0.311) (0.361) (0.307) (0.251)
OECD 0.283 0.265 0.218
(0.214) (0.217) (0.194)
Observations 99 98 90 65 57 38 61 60
Pseudo R-squared 0.33 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.31 0.46 0.50 0.51
All Income Levels Low & Middle Income  20 
Table 4: Takeoffs and financial flows, extended control vector (dependent variable: realization of a 
takeoff) 
 
Note: Probit estimation results with clustering by country and robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** 
indicate coefficients significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Controls from base regression included but 
coefficients omitted for brevity. Marginal effect estimate used in the standard deviation analysis take from 
specification (6) (highlighted).  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
portfolio debt outflow -0.045 -0.096 -0.191 9.691*** 8.538** 1.116 4.947* -0.615** -0.039
(0.151) (0.192) (0.260) (3.334) (3.474) (2.849) (2.825) (0.314) (0.151)
portfolio debt inflow 0.939** 0.963*** 0.719*** 1.339** 1.122* 0.664* 0.410 1.399*** 0.974***
(0.381) (0.256) (0.246) (0.627) (0.614) (0.402) (0.525) (0.460) (0.352)
portfolio equity outflow -3.544** -4.334* -2.740*** 0.598 1.109 -0.148 -1.251 -0.28 -3.765**
(1.508) (2.289) (1.005) (4.876) (4.635) (4.820) (4.911) (2.256) (1.548)
portfolio equity inflow -0.645 -0.783* -1.355 -0.241 -0.132 -0.567 -0.646 -1.099** -0.632
(0.423) (0.424) (1.012) (0.414) (0.434) (0.389) (0.778) (0.516) (0.449)
fdi outflow 1.198** 1.317*** 0.829*** 1.139* 0.971 1.573 0.644 1.518** 1.266**
(0.519) (0.501) (0.286) (0.665) (0.682) (1.408) (0.596) (0.655) (0.532)
fdi inflow  0.190* 0.228** 0.220** 0.330*** 0.354*** 0.419*** 0.205** 0.253*** 0.152**
(0.102) (0.108) (0.101) (0.114) (0.117) (0.160) (0.103) (0.076) (0.064)
change in CTOT 0.017*** 0.029*** 0.026***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.007)
short-term external debt -0.020* -0.045** -0.029*
(0.011) (0.021) (0.018)
years of schooling 0.046 0.147*
(0.044) (0.075)
regchange
Civil War -0.325 -0.311***
(0.208) (0.118)
















Observations 98 80 83 65 65 47 54 83 94
Pseudo R-squared 0.39 0.42 0.34 0.41 0.38 0.46 0.31 0.39 0.36  21 
Table 5: Takeoffs and financial flows, regional effects (dependent variable: realization of a takeoff).  
 
Note: Probit estimation results with clustering by country and robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** 
indicate coefficients significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Controls from base regression included but 








portfolio debt outflow -0.035 -0.041
(0.095) (0.101)
portfolio debt inflow 0.687*** 0.775***
(0.260) (0.278)
portfolio equity outflow -2.301** -2.216**
(1.145) (1.078)
portfolio equity inflow -0.520* -0.495
(0.301) (0.312)
fdi outflow 0.698* 0.770**
(0.387) (0.354)












portfolio equity outflow x Latin America -19.877**-17.159***
(9.350) (5.354)
Observations 99 99
Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.34  22 
Table 6: Change in the takeoff probability due to a conditioning variable taking on its average value 
 
Note: Using coefficients from probit regression, the marginal contribution of each conditioning variable to the 
probability of TO=1 is evaluate and the variable’s subsample (TO=0 & TO=1) mean. We then multiply the value in 
equation (2) by the variable’s sample average to evaluate its average association with the probability of a takeoff. *, 
**, *** indicate that the coefficient on the conditioning variable in the probit regressions was significant at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
Table 7: Change in the takeoff probability due to one standard deviation rise in the conditioning variable 
 
Note: Using coefficients from probit regression, the marginal contribution of each conditioning variable to the 
probability of TO=1 is evaluate and the variable’s subsample (TO=0 & TO=1) mean. We then multiply the value in 
equation (2) by the variable’s standard deviation to evaluate its economic impact on the probability of a takeoff. *, 
**, *** indicate that the coefficient on the conditioning variable in the probit regressions was significant at the 10%, 




All Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa Asia
portfolio debt outflow 0.59% 1.02% 0.02% 0.10%
portfolio debt inflow** 24.63% 13.92% 0.05% 33.47%
portfolio equity outflow** 11.02% 0.56% 0.27% 0.00%
portfolio equity inflow -4.84% -5.37% -3.50% 0.04%
fdi outflow** -21.55% -2.32% -4.53% 0.28%
fdi inflow * 23.15% 65.42% 9.23% 26.45%
short-term external debt** -25.57% -41.02% -21.24% -20.23%
change in CTOT*** -2.02% -7.52% 1.97% -12.19%
All Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa Asia
portfolio debt outflow -3.51% -4.15% -0.11% -0.22%
portfolio debt inflow** 71.06% 41.51% 0.99% 93.68%
portfolio equity outflow** -46.96% -6.13% -9.93% 0.00%
portfolio equity inflow -16.85% -22.36% -13.45% -0.13%
fdi outflow** 62.31% 5.49% 12.94% 1.86%
fdi inflow * 75.46% 84.72% 18.70% 29.26%
short-term external debt** -37.49% -55.66% -28.63% -34.68%
change in CTOT*** 28.36% 31.02% 30.66% 28.21%  23 
Table 8: Change in the takeoff probability due to one standard deviation rise in the conditioning variable 
 
Notes: The last column of the table measures the difference in the predicted probability of a takeoff between specific 
countries whose values of conditional variables are approximately one standard deviation apart, with the lower value 
drawn close to the sample mean. This methodology is robust to the concavity in the shape of the cumulative 












value (% GDP) Pr(Takeoff) value (% GDP) Pr(Takeoff)
portfolio debt outflow
-0.14 12.61% 0.66 1.02%
portfolio debt inflow**
0.25 49.01% 1.03 88.28%
portfolio equity outflow**
-0.03 68.54% 0.11 8.06%
portfolio equity inflow
0.12 67.83% 0.39 18.48%
fdi outflow**
-0.18 40.01% 0.36 65.15%
fdi inflow *
1.24 26.04% 5.71 99.99%
short-term external debt**
5.52 27.31% 14.59 7.27%
change in CTOT***


























Sri Lanka (1999)  24 
Table 9: Sustained takeoffs and financial flows (dependent variable: takeoff lasting 8 year or more) 
 
Note: Probit estimation results with clustering by country and robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** 
indicate coefficients significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. OECD dummy dropped due to collinearity. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
net portfolio debt inflow 0.359* 0.330* 0.297** 0.665*** 0.899*** 2.113**
(0.191) (0.195) (0.141) (0.192) (0.237) (1.021)
net portfolio equity inflow -1.649** -1.367* -0.765 -1.499* -2.256** 19.731***
(0.831) (0.795) (0.501) (0.900) (0.885) (5.969)
net fdi inflow  -0.361*** -0.569*** -0.250** -0.674*** -0.694*** -0.602***
(0.140) (0.173) (0.121) (0.196) (0.204) (0.223)
change in CTOT 0.960* 2.268** 2.713** 6.162*** 9.394*** 1.273
(0.538) (0.955) (1.248) (2.380) (2.251) (0.842)
loggdp 0.13 0.006 -0.095 -0.531** -0.815***
(0.104) (0.131) (0.112) (0.260) (0.294)
logpop -0.037 0.225** -0.053 0.169** 0.220*
(0.053) (0.109) (0.034) (0.082) (0.133)
openness 1.835*** 1.979*** 2.897***
(0.651) (0.510) (0.958)
Latin America -0.112 -0.29 -0.441**
(0.085) (0.261) (0.205)
Asia 0.073 -0.337 -0.595**
(0.235) (0.219) (0.261)




short-term external debt -0.029
(0.019)
Observations 31 28 31 28 28 18
Pseudo R-squared 0.28 0.45 0.52 0.62 0.69 0.55  25 
Figures 
Figure 1: Economic growth and change in the stock of short-term external debt for selected countries. 
 
Notes: The figure corroborates negative association between economic growth and a country’s stock of short-term external debt for selected countries (three from 
Caribbean-Latin America, East and South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa respectively).  Takeoff episodes indicated with vertical bars.   26 
Figure 2: Economic growth and FDI inflows for selected countries. 
 
Notes: The figure corroborates positive association between economic growth and a country’s FDI inflow for selected countries (three from Caribbean-Latin 
America, East and South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa respectively).  Takeoff episodes indicated with vertical bars. 
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Figure 3: Economic growth and commodity terms of trade changes for selected countries. 
 
Notes: The figure corroborates positive association between economic growth and a country’s commodity terms of trade for selected countries (three from 
Caribbean-Latin America, East and South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa respectively).  Takeoff episodes indicated with vertical bars. 
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Figure 5: Predicted probability of a takeoff based on probit regression results and portfolio debt inflows. 
 
Notes: The figure shows the predicted probability of a takeoff based on probit regression results and portfolio debt 
inflows with fractional polynomial fit to the data. 
 
Figure 6: Predicted probability of a takeoff based on probit regression results and port. equity outflows. 
 
Notes: The figure shows the predicted probability of a takeoff based on probit regression results and portfolio equity 
outflows with fractional polynomial fit to the data. 
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Figure 7: Predicted probability of a takeoff based on probit regression results and short-term external debt. 
 
Notes: The figure shows the predicted probability of a takeoff based on probit regression results and the stock of 
short-term external debt with best linear fit. The correlation coefficient is negative and significant at -0.2081***    
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Figure 8: The effect of commodity terms of trade shocks on the probability of a takeoff for different 
income levels. 
 
Notes: The figure depicts the income effect of commodity terms of trade shock for countries of different income 
levels. The income effect is proxied by the marginal effect of a positive commodity terms of trade shock on the on 
the probability of a takeoff. The left axis shows marginal effects estimated with baseline probit specification (2) at 
the given income level (horizontal axis, log scale); z-statistics of estimated coefficients in parentheses. Points of 
GDP per capita corresponding to subsamples averages of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Asia, and OECD are 
labeled accordingly. Marginal effect of approximately 1.7 for a country with GDP per capita of $4,000 (which is the 
subsample average for Asian countries) indicates that a 1 percent improvement in the commodity terms of trade is 
associated with a 1.6 percent higher predicted probability of economic takeoff. The right axis shows the product of 
the marginal effect coefficient and subsample standard deviation of dCTOT for each income range. For a country 
with income level of approximately $4,000 per capita a one standard deviation improvement in commodity terms of 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Variable definitions and sources 
 
Notes: Portfolio debt, equity and FDI flows, and stock of short-term external debt to GDP ratios enter as 5-year 











Variable Name: Definition: Source:
portfolio debt in(out)flows
Debt security liabilities  to nonresidents (market value, inflow) minus debt security 
assets (market value, outflow); %GDP
portfolio equity in(out)flow
Equity security liabilities to nonresidents (market value, inflow) minus equity 
security assets (market value, outflow); %GDP
FDI in(out)flows
Direct investment in reporting economy (flow) minus direct investment abroad 
(flow); % GDP
short-term external debt
Gross External Short-Term Debt of Central Gov't, Monetary Authorities, Banks, 
and Other Institutions; % GDP
Joint External Debt Hub (JEDH) database, joint IMF and the 
World Bank. Available for countries that subscribe to the 
IMF's Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS)
CTOT
where j denotes one of the six commodity categories (food, fuels, agricultural raw 
materials, metals, gold, and beverages), Pj is the price index for each commodity, 
and Xij and Mij are the average shares of commodity j in country i‘s exports and 
imports respectively over the period 1980 through 2001. Commodity prices are 
deflated by the manufacturing unit value index (MUV). 
Commodity prices are obtained from Commodity Price 
Database, IMF 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp). 
MUV is obtained from Global Economic Monitor Database, 
World Bank; Commodity export shares come from IMF data, 
see Lee, Milesi-Ferretti and Ricci (2008).
openness Ratio of exports plus imports over GDP in local currency units International Financial Statistics, IMF
tariff rate  Average annual tariff rate Dollar-Kraay (2004) data
income level  log of real GDP per capita
population log of population
years of schooling  years of education in the population above the age of 25 Barro and Lee (1993) dataset
Comm/GDP Commodities to GDP ratio
Manuf/GDP Manufacturing to GDP ratio
Serv/GDP  Services to GDP ratio
DomCredit Domestic credit GDP ratio
Liquidity Liquidt liabilities to GDP ratio
Money Money to GDP ratio
Reg.Chng. Political regime change indicator Marshall-Jaggers (2002) Policy IV dataset
War End 
Takes on a value of 1 if there has been a cessation of conflict within the previous 
5 years and 0 otherwise 
Civil War
Takes on a value of 1 if there has been a civil war within the previous 5 years and 
zero otherwise
Leader Death
Takes on the value of 1 if a country’s leader has died within the previous 5 years 
and 0 otherwise Jones and Olken (2005) dataset 
Singer and Small (2003) Correlates of War database
World Development Indicators (WDI), The World Bank
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009) Penn World Tables 6.3
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Table A2: Financial flows and stock of short-term external debt, starting observation by country. 
 
Note: The first column indicates the year(s) in which a country experienced an economic takeoff. If observations on 
financial controls end prior to the year 2000, the ending year is indicated in parentheses. 
 
Country Year(s) of Takeoff Portfolio Debt  Portfolio Equity FDI Short-Term Ext. Debt
Angola 1996 1996 1996 1996
Albania 1992 (1998) 1992 1992 1992
Argentina 1963 1989 1989 1989 1989
Armenia 1996 1996 1998 1994
Antigua 1995 1977 (1994) 1977 (1994) 1977
Australia 1960 1960 1960
Austria 1967 1967 1967
Azerbaijan 1995 1995 1995
Burundi 1980 1985 1985 1985 1970
Belgium 1985
Benin 1974 1974 1974 1970
Burkina Faso 1972 1974 1974 1974 1970
Bangladesh 1979, 1989 1976 1976 1976 1973
Bulgaria 1992 1992 1992 1991
Belarus 1995 1996 1997 1997 1995
Belize 1985 1984 1984 1984 1973
Bolivia 1960, 1968 1985 1985 1985 1985
Brazil 1993 1993 1993 1993
Barbados 1984, 1995 1970 1970 1970
Botswana 1965 1975 1975 1975 1970
Central African Republic 1977 1977 1977 1970
Canada 1960, 1991 1950 1950 1950
Switzerland 1977 1977 1983
Chile 1973, 1983 1975 1975 1975 1970
China 1961, 1971 1982 1982 1982 1981
Cote d`Ivoire 1975 1975 1975 1970
Cameroon 1965 1977 1977 1977 1970
Congo, Republic of 1967 1978 1978 1978 1970
Colombia 1968 1968 1968 1970
Comoros 1983 (1999) 1983 (1999) 1983 (1999) 1970 (1999)
Cape Verde 1965, 1974 1977 (1996) 1977 (1996) 1977 1981
Costa Rica 1963 1977 1977 1977 1970
Cuba
Cyprus 1960, 1975 1976 1976 1976
Czech Republic 1993 1993 1993
Dominica 1976 (1994) 1976 (1994) 1976 1981
Denmark 1981 1975 1975 1975
Dominican Republic 1965, 1986 1968 1968 (1996) 1968 1970
Algeria 1970 1977 (1995) 1977 (1995) 1977 (1995)
Ecuador 1966
Egypt 1974 1977 1977 1977 1970
Spain 1979 1975 1975 1975
Estonia 1993 1993 1993
Ethiopia 1991 1977 (1998) 1977 (1998) 1977 (1998) 1970
Finland 1978, 1992 1975 1975 1975
Fiji 1965, 1983 1979 1979 1979 1970
France 1975 1983 1975
Gabon 1981 1978 1978 1978 1970
United Kingdom 1981 1970 1970 1970
Germany 1971 1971 1971
Ghana 1960 1985 1985 1985 1985
Guinea
Gambia, The 1979 1978 (1998) 1978 (1998) 1978 (1998) 1970
Guinea-Bissau 1966, 1992 1986 (1997) 1986 (1997) 1986 (1997) 1986
Equatorial Guinea 1965 1987 1987 1987
Greece 1990 1976 1976 1976
Grenada 1994 1977 (1994) 1977 (1994) 1977 1973
Guatemala 1977 1977 (1998) 1977 (1998) 1970
Guyana 1960, 1992 1977 1977 (1989) 1977 (1989) 1970
Hong Kong 1998 1998 1998
Honduras 1970 1974 1974 1974 1970
Haiti 1972 1971 1971 1971 1970
Hungary 1990 1982 1982 1982
Indonesia 1965 1981 1981 (1998) 1981 1970
India 1966, 1974 1975 1975 1975 1970
Ireland 1974 1974 1974
Iran 1987 1976 1976 1976 1971
Iceland 1960, 1992 1976 1976 1976
Israel 1967 1980 1980 1980
Italy 1970 1970 1970
Jamaica 1976 1976 1976 1970
Jordan 1969 1972 1972 1972 1970
Japan 1977 1977 1977  34 
Table A2 (Cont’d): Financial flows and stock of short-term external debt, starting observation by country. 
 
Note: The first column indicates the year(s) in which a country experienced an economic takeoff. If observations on 
financial controls end prior to the year 2000, the ending year is indicated in parentheses.  
Country Year(s) of Takeoff Portfolio Debt  Portfolio Equity FDI Short-Term Ext. Debt
Kazakhstan 1995 1997 1995 1994
Kenya 1961, 1970 1975 1975 1975 1970
Kyrgyzstan 1995 1998 1998 1994
Cambodia 1998 1998 1998 1990
St. Kitts & Nevis 1980 (1994) 1980 (1994) 1980 1984
Korea, Republic of 1960 1976 1976 1976
Lebanon 1970
St. Lucia 1986 (1995) 1976 (1995) 1976 1981
Sri Lanka 1974 1975 1975 1975 1970
Lesotho 1969, 1990 1975 (1998) 1975 (1998) 1975 (1998) 1970
Lithuania 1994 1993 1995 1993
Luxembourg 1977
Latvia 1995 1996 1993 1992
Macao
Morocco 1960 1975 1975 1975 1970
Madagascar 1974 (1994) 1974 (1994) 1974 (1999) 1970
Mexico 1995 1979 1979 1979 1970
Macedonia
Mali 1973, 1993 1975 1975 1975 1970
Mozambique 1966, 1993 1980 1980 1980 1984
Mauritania 1975 1975 1975 1970
Mauritius 1960, 1968 1976 1976 1976 1970
Malawi 1960, 1994 1977 1977 1977 1970
Malaysia 1986 1974 1974 1974 1970
Namibia 1990 1990 1990
Niger 1974 1974 1974 1970
Nigeria 1965 1977 1977 1977 1970
Nicaragua 1960 1990 1990 1990 1990
Netherlands 1967 1967 1967
Norway 1991 1975 1975 1975
Nepal 1980 1976 1976 1976 1970
New Zealand 1968 1972 (1995) 1972 (1995) 1972
Pakistan 1960 1976 1976 1976 1970
Panama 1976, 1987 1977 1977 1977 1970
Peru 1961 1991 1990 1991 1990
Philippines 1992 1977 1977 1977 1970
Papua New Guinea 1970, 1988 1976 1976 1976 1970
Poland 1984, 1990 1981 1981 1981
Portugal 1978 1975 1975 1975
Paraguay 1975 1975 1975 1970
Romania 1980 1991 1991 1991
Russia 1994 1994 1994 1993
Rwanda 1965, 1974 1976 1976 1976 1970
Senegal 1974 1974 1974 1970
Singapore 1972 1972 1972
Sierra Leone 1967, 1973 1977 1977 1977 1970
El Salvador 1960
Sao Tome and Principe 1980, 1986
Slovak Republic 1992 1994 1993 1993
Slovenia 1995 1992 1992 1992
Sweden 1970 1970 1970
Seychelles 1965 1976 1976 (1992) 1976 1980
Syria 1967, 1989 1977 1977 1977 1995
Chad 1982 1977 (1998) 1977 (1998) 1977 (1998) 1970
Togo 1971 1974 1974 1974 1970
Thailand 1975 1975 1975 1970
Trinidad &Tobago 1971, 1992 1975 (1998) 1975 (1999) 1975
Tunisia 1989 1976 1976 1976 1970
Turkey 1962 1992 1992 1992 1992
Taiwan
Tanzania 1980 1976 1976 1976 1970
Uganda 1973, 1986 1981 1981 1981 1981
Ukraine 1994 1996 1994 1993
Uruguay 1974, 1983 1978 1978 1978 1978
United States 1960, 1982 1970 1970 1970
St.Vincent & Grenadines 1978 1978 1978 1975
Venezuela 1961 1984 1984 1984 1984
Vietnam 1996 1989
Yemen 1998 1990 1998 1990
South Africa 1950 1950 1950 1994
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Zambia 1978 1978 1978 1970
Zimbabwe 1962, 1977 1992 1992 1992 1992